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AN EXAMINATION OF MANDATORY
RETIREMENT PROVISIONS FOR POLICE
OFFICERS
I. INTRODUCTION
The 1960's marked a decade when American society as a whole
became cognizant of the harmful effects of discrimination. In addition to
the well-known advances toward equality in race and gender, America
also made great progress towards the elimination of age discrimination in
the workplace.' This progress is reflected by Congress' 1967 enactment
of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).2 Essentially, the
purpose of this act is to promote employment of older people based on
ability rather than age. 3 Age-based discrimination occurs frequently in
cases dealing with tenured university faculty, passenger carrier operators,
state court judges, business partners, and law enforcement personnel.4

'See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a) (West 1976) (stating employer may not discharge
or refuse to hire employee because of race or gender).
2 See Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.A. §§
621-634 (West 1994)) (declaring unlawful to refuse to hire or discharge individual based
on age).
'See 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 (b) (West 1967) (articulating purpose of elimination of arbitrary age discrimination in employment).
4 See Martin Schiff, The Age Discriminationin Employment Act: Whither the
Bona
Fide OccupationalQualificationand Law Enforcement Exemptions? 67 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 27, 33 (1993) (noting courts more likely to uphold age-based mandatory retirement
in some occupations than others). For example, courts are likely to uphold age-based
mandatory retirement of passenger carrier operators more than age-based mandatory
retirement of public safety personnel. Id. See also Tina E. Sciocchetti Comment, Mandatory Retirement of Appointed State Judge--Age Discriminational,85 N.W.U.L. REV.
866, 901 (1991) (arguing states may not mandatorily retire judges); Don R. Sampen, Age
Discriminationand Reasonable Non-Age Factors, 24 J.C. & U.L. 1, 20-24 (1997) (analyzing court decisions dealing with age-based discrimination in certain occupational
fields). See also infra notes 58-144 and accompanying text (outlining court's holdings
that adjudicate issues of forced retirement for public safety personnel); Sampen at n. 142
(setting forth various court's rulings on cases dealing with mandatory retirement of business partners); Amy Gibbons, No Place to Go After 60: The Plight of Pilotsand Flight
Engineers in the Airline Industry, 2 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 355 (1985) (articulating standards when deciding cases dealing with forced retirement of pilots); Marc L. Kesselman,
Putting the Professor to Bed: Mandatory Retirement of Tenured University Faculty in
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A common type of age-based discrimination occurs when state
law mandates that law enforcement personnel retire at a certain age. 5
Surprisingly, however, these mandatory retirement provisions for law
enforcement personnel do not always violate the ADEA.6 The ADEA
contains a clause that permits employers to set an age qualification, like a
mandatory retirement age, for a job if that is a bona fide occupational
qualification 7 To uphold these mandatory retirement provisions, courts
require employers to make a fact-intensive showing of why these provisions are necessary.8 The Supreme Court, however, has not clarified
what facts are needed. 9 Consequently, courts have inconsistently interpreted analogous fact patterns.' 0
This article will examine the practice of state and local police
departments mandatorily retiring their officers at a certain age. The article focuses on the bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) defenses
that police departments often assert to justify their mandatory retirement
ages. Part II of this note details the evolution of governmental agencies
retiring their law enforcement officers." Part III outlines the history of
the ADEA in addition to illuminating its central purposes and
provisions.' 2 Part IV will explain the Supreme Court's standard in dethe United States and Canada: 17 CoMP. LAB. L.J. 206, 215 (1995) (analyzing American
and Canadian courts' rulings on mandatory retirement for tenured university faculty).
"See MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 32, § 26(3)(a) (1991) (declaring all members of consolidated police force must retire at age 55).
6 See EEOC v. New Jersey, 631 F. Supp. 1506, 1515 (3rd Cir. 1987) (noting that
mandatory retirement system did not violate ADEA); EOC v. City of East Providence,
798 F.2d 524, 530 (1 st Cir. 1986) (indicating age-based mandatory retirement scheme
did not violate ADEA).
7 See 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(0 (West 1994). Section 623(0 provides in pertinent part:
"It shall not be unlawful for an employer to [set an age qualification] where age is a bona
fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business." Id. See also infra notes 62-64 and accompanying text (outlining recent
case law that applies BFOQ standard).
"See Johnson v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 472 U.S. 353, 362 (1985)
(setting forth BFOQ standard).
9See generally Western Air Lines Inc., v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 417 (1985)
(noting Court omits specifics in what it defines as "reasonable").
'oCompare EEOC v. City of Janesville, 630 F.2d 1254, 1258 (7th Cir. 1980) (de-

claring all police officers subject to identical mandatory retirement policy regardless of
their individual duties) with EEOC v. City of St. Paul, 657 F.2d 1162, 1165 (8th Cir.
1982) (finding unfair to subject all police officers with different duties to same mandatory retirement policy).
" See infra notes 17-37 and accompanying text.
1 See infra notes 38-50 and accompanying
text.
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termining whether the employer's age qualifications are BFOQs. 13 Part
V will analyze the case law that somewhat clarifies this standard. 4 Part
VI will conclude by explaining the current status of mandatory retirement provisions for Massachusetts State Police officers, a standard 6which
5
Gately v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts' dramatically refined.

II. THE HISTORY OF MANDATORY RETIREMENT FOR LAW
ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL
Early retirement provisions for law enforcement personnel were
first introduced in America in 1947 when Congress amended the Civil
Service Retirement Act of 1930.17 This amendment allowed voluntary,
early retirement for Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) personnel
whom the Attorney General deemed were performing their duties inefficiently.' 8 The government characterized this retirement option for the
officers as a reward for the years of dangerous work that they had performed for society.' 9 More importantly, by inducing these officers to
retire voluntarily, the government minimized hazards that occurred when
officers continued to work as their physical abilities declined. 20 When

"See infra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
' See infra notes 60-115 and accompanying text.
"1998 WL 518179 (D. Mass. June 8, 1998).
"Id. See also infra notes 116-150 and accompanying text.
17 See Schiff, supra note 4, at 18 (quoting
Act of July 17, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80168, 61 Stat. 307 (1947)) (amending Civil Service Retirement Act of 1930, Pub. L. No.
71-279, 46 Stat. 468 (1930)).
'8See id. at 18 (noting option availability to officers after they reached age 50 or
20 service years).
" See Johnson v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 472 U.S. 353, 364 (1985)
(discussing older agents should not remain with FBI merely because of lack of retirement
plan). Congress designed this optional retirement in part as an added stimulus to morale
in the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Id. (quoting S. Rep. No. 76, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess., 1-2 (1947)). Further, Congress designed this provision to act as an incentive for
the [officers] to remain [with the FBI] until a reasonable retirement age is reached. Id.
Moreover, Attorney General Tom C. Clark revealed that the Department of Justice
sought to maintain the FBI as a young man's service." Id. at 364 (quoting S. Rep. No.
76, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1947)).
20 See Schiff, supra note 4, at 19 (noting retirement option also intended to help
prevent burnout).
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Congress passed this21 law, however, the government incurred minimal
initial pension costs.
When other government employees who performed work similar
to FBI agents found out about these pensions, they demanded similar
pensions for themselves.2 2 In 1948, Congress offered these benefits to all
federal employees whose duties included "investigation, apprehension
and detention of individuals suspected or convicted of committing federal crimes. 23 Consequently, by 1972, the government extended retirement benefits to many more employees than when it originally passed
the law.24 Moreover, these early retirement benefits did not conflict with
the ADEA because they were wholly optional. 25
In 1974, Congress violated ADEA principles when it passed a
law that implemented a mandatory retirement system for federal law enforcement officers and firefighters. 26 This new law went into effect January 1, 1978 and mandated retirement for the officers and firefighters who
reached the age 55 and had completed 20 years of service.27 Congress
passed this law even though earlier in the year it had amended the ADEA
21See

The Myths and Realities ofAge Limits for Law Enforcement and Firefighting Personnel,A Report by the Chairmanof the Select Committee on Aging, H.R. Doc.
No. 468, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1984) [hereinafter Myths and Realities] (maintaining
when Congress passed law only 36 FBI officers were eligible to receive pension benefit).
Further, only 64 agents became eligible for the retirement benefits in the course of the
next five years. Id.
2 See Schiff, supra note 4, at 19 (recognizing government employees wanted
similar pension benefits).
See id.
See id. (noting expansion of pension benefits to federal correction employees, air
traffic controllers, and firefighters).
See id. (noting retirement scheme cannot violate ADEA if optional); see also
infra notes 38-50 and accompanying text (describing purpose and evolution of ADEA).
2

24

See Act of July 12, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-350, sec. 4, § 8335, 88 Stat. 356
(1976)) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 8335(b) (1988)). The Act provides in pertinent part: "[When a firefighter] becomes 55 ...or completes 20 years of service [that
firefighter] shall be separated from service." Id. Section d of the Act provides in pertinent part: "[When a member of the Capitol Police] becomes 55 ...or completes 20 years
of service [that police officer] shall be separated from service." 5 U.S.C. § 8335(d)
(1988)). See also Schiff, supra note 4, at 19 (suggesting new law contradicted ADEA).
2 See Johnson v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 472 U.S. 353, 364 (1985)
(outlining history of statute). Neither the language nor the legislative history surrounding 5 U.S.C § 8335 establish why Congress thought age 55 was an appropriate age to
force a federal law enforcement officer to retire. Id. at 365. Further, there is no indication whether Congress believed that older federal law enforcement officers could not
meet the rigors of their occupation. Id.
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to cover federal, state, and local governments.28 Consequently, Congress
implicitly narrowed the ADEA's scope to cover only state and local law
enforcement and firefighting personnel. 29 Moreover, when Congress enacted this bill, it omitted all references to employee hazards that the 1947
optional retirement bill contained. In effect, this new bill departed from
the rationale of why Congress originally introduced the early retirement
option. 3' Further, supporters of this new legislation claimed this system
would improve the quality of law enforcement and firefighting because it
would allow for a youthful and energetic work force.32 This argument,
however, is a direct contradiction to the purpose of the ADEA as it
equates youth with competence and energy while analogizing aging to
incompetence and sluggishness.33
Presently, there is a glaring inconsistency in the law as Congress
has decreed that federal law enforcement officials must retire when they
reach a certain age, to keep these forces youthful and energetic.34 State
and local law enforcement agencies, however, must adhere to the rigid
guidelines of the ADEA, a statute that strongly discourages age-based

See Schiff, supra note 4, at 20 (noting Congress expanded ADEA's reach to almost all sectors of government).
See id. (acknowledging Congress obliquely limited scope of ADEA). In 1985,
the Supreme Court affirmed that the ADEA was not applicable to federal law enforcement officials. See Johnson, 472 U.S. at 366-70 (articulating legislative history of
ADEA does not establish coverage for federal public safety employees).
30 See Schiff, supra note 4, at 19, 20 (quoting Act of July 12, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93350, sec. 5, § 8336(c), 88 Stat. 356 (1974)) (recognizing new law lacked important references).
31 See Johnson, 472 U.S. at 364 (noting Congress implemented
optional retirement
system for FBI personnel as reward for years of service).
3 See Schiff, supra note 4, at 20 (recognizing argument that youth and energy improve quality of work force). The supporters of this bill, who argue the retirement provision would maintain a youthful force, overlook the fact that if a person has not completed 20 years of service the retirement provision does not take effect. Johnson, 472
U.S. at 365. For example, if a 63 year old firefighter has only ten years of service, then
that firefighter will not have to retire. Id. Consequently, this exception undermines the
argument that Congress is afraid that the public would be jeopardized by the employment
of older firefighters or older law enforcement personnel. Id. at 365-66.

"sSee Schiff, supra note 4, at 20 (dismissing supporter's argument as contradictory). By 1978, the optional early retirement program, which Congress passed in 1947 as
a reward for 36 brave and hardworking FBI agents, had evolved into a monolithic agebased hiring system and mandatory retirement system for more than 52,000 employees.
Id.
, See Schiff, supra note 4, at 20 (noting ADEA does not protect federal law enforcement officials).
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mandatory retirement.35 Consequently, state and local law enforcement
agencies face increased difficulty in maintaining a force which is youthful and vigorous. 36 As one legal analyst notes, "[It seems like there is an]
absence of logic in justifying an exemption based on solely whether a
law enforcement officer ... is classified as federal as opposed to state or
local. 37

III. THE DRAFTING AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE ADEA
In 1967, Congress enacted the ADEA in response to President
Johnson's and society's genera; disapproval of employment practices
that equate age with ability. 38 The three purposes of the ADEA are to
"promote the employment of older persons based on their ability rather
than their age, to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment,
and to help employers and workers to find ways of meeting problems
arising from the impact of age in employment. 3 9 The legislative history
35See id. at 21 (recognizing ADEA protects state law enforcement officials); see
also infra notes 38-44 and accompanying text (describing history and purpose of
ADEA.)
s6 See Schiff, supra note 4, at 21 (recognizing potential for state and local police
departments to be old and lethargic).
3

7 id.

38

See Robert L. Fischman, Note, The BFOQ Defense in ADEA Suits: The Scope of
'Duties on the Job', 85 MICH. L. REV. 330 (1986) (noting age discrimination mostly
springs from unsubstantiated stereotypes). President Johnson realized that setting arbitrary age qualifications to jobs had a devastating effect on the dignity of the prospective
employee. Western Air Lines Inc., v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 410 (1985). He also recognized that by setting arbitrary age qualifications, the national economy would lose a
staggering amount of human resources. Id. In 1967, while speaking to Congress, Johnson declared, "Hundreds of thousands not yet old, not yet voluntarily retired, find themselves jobless because of arbitrary age discrimination. Despite our present low rate of
unemployment, there has been a persistent average of 850,000 people age 45 and over
who are unemployed." H.R. Doc. No. 40,90th Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (1967), Legislative
History 61, quoted in Criswell,472 U.S. at 412 n.13. Johnson further added, "in economic terms, this is a serious--and senseless-- loss to a nation on the move. But the
greater loss is the cruel sacrifice in happiness and well being which joblessness imposes
on these citizens and their families." Id.
3929 U.S.C.A. § 621(b) (West 1994). Arbitrary age discrimination occurs when
one makes an assumption about the effect of age on an older worker when there is no
basis for that assumption. Williard Wirtz, Report of the Secretaryof Labor to Congress
Under Section 715 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, The Older American Worker: Age
Discriminationin Employment, at 2 (1965). Wirtz, the Secretary of Labor, found that
there were many workplaces which set limitations for employees based on age regardless
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of the ADEA indicates that the statute's purpose is to reduce the waste
that results from the underutilization of skilled and experienced
workers. 40 The Senate concluded that if workers have the skill and ability to perform their jobs, they should not be denied employment. 4 , The
ADEA provides that employers may not "discharge any individual or
otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's age. ' 42 Likewise, the "remedial and humanitarian" nature of the ADEA warrants a broad construction as to effectuate its purposes.43 Currently, the ADEA prohibits arbitrary age discrimination to
both public and private sector employees over age 40.44
of whether the employees could still perform the work adequately. Id. at 7. See also
EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 231 (1983) (articulating that stereotypes not supported by factual basis cause age-based discrimination). This discrimination eliminated
the worker's ability to "engage in productive and satisfying occupations which caused
the worker to sustain economic and psychological injury." Id.
4 See Francesca Capitano, Age Discriminationand Police Employment Practices,
4 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 153, 161-62 (1986) (indicating discrimination causes economic and
psychological burden on society). Courts have also recognized that older employees
provide invaluable experience. See Aaron v. Davis, 414 F. Supp. 453, 459 (E.D. Ark.
1976) (noting value of older police officers because of their experience).
41See Sampen, supra note 4, at 6 (articulating that Congress wants skilled workers,
regardless of their age). One proponent asserted that it seemed "unjustifiable to retire a
worker just because the worker reaches a certain age." Id. at n. 47, (quoting S. Rep. No.
95-453, (1977) at 31. Moreover, courts have recognized that the ADEA applies with
especial force when addressing mandatory retirement provisions. Criswell,472 U.S. at
410.
42 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(a)(1) (West 1994).

" See Durant v. Maher Chevrolet, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 787, 789 (M.D. Fla. 1991)
(recognizing ADEA's remedial nature and therefore should be construed liberally for full
effect).
" See 29 U.S.C.A. § 631(a) (West 1994) (providing protection to individuals
above age 40). When Congress passed the ADEA, its prohibitions against age discrimination in the workplace only applied to employees who were between the ages of 40 and
65. 29 U.S.C.A. § 631(a) (1967). In 1978, Congress amended the ADEA, resulting in
the statute protecting individuals between the ages of 40 and 70. 29 U.S.C.A. § 631(a)
(1979). In 1986, Congress amended the ADEA to eliminate the maximum age requirement and now the ADEA protects all individuals over the age of 40 from arbitrary age
discrimination. 29 U.S.C.A. § 631(a) (1994). At its inception, the ADEA only applied
to private employers, labor organizations, and employment agencies. Schiff, supra note
4, at 1. Congress amended the ADEA in 1974 to extend the same protection against age
discrimination to employees of federal, state, and local governments and the Supreme
Court upheld this extension to state and local employees. See Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 248
(holding extension valid because of Congress' power under Commerce Clause). In dissent, Chief Justice Burger argued that if Congress extended the ADEA to the states it
would impair their sovereignty because the state would not be able to choose who could
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Today, a majority of cases considering mandatory retirement
provisions are analyzed in light of the ADEA. 45 To establish a prima
facie case of age discrimination under the ADEA, plaintiffs must show
that they are over age forty, are qualified for the position, have suffered
an adverse employment decision, and were replaced by a sufficiently
younger person. 46 It is simple, however, for officers to establish prima
facie cases when law enforcement agencies force them to retire since the
agencies will usually concede that age is the reason for the mandatory
retirement. 47 When it is undisputed that an employer discharged an employee solely because of age, the burden shifts to the employer to prove

serve as a law enforcement officer. Id. at 252. When dealing with mandatory retirement
provisions, however, the ADEA only protects state and local law enforcement officials
because Congress passed a subsequent bill mandating that the government can force
federal law enforcement officials into mandatory retirement. See supra notes 34-37 and
accompanying text (articulating double standard). After the Wyoming Court declared
that the ADEA applied to state and local entities, the EEOC intensified its fight against
mandatory retirement provisions. Sampen, supra note 4, at 8. In 1986, Congress
amended the ADEA, and although these amendments still prohibited aged-based mandatory retirement provisions, it provided exceptions for public safety officers, such as
police officers or firefighters. Sampen, supra note 4, at 8. Specifically, these exceptions
provided that the state or local law which set the age qualification had to be in effect by
March 1983 and had to be "pursuant to a bona fide hiring or retirement plan." Sampen,
supra note 4, at 8. Congress passed these amendments because the legislators feared
endangering public safety if police forces maintained older police officers. Sampen,
supra note 4, at 8. The legislators made this exception temporary, from January 1, 1987
until December 31, 1993, presumably to allow the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) to investigate the consequences of mandatory retirement on society. Id. In 1996, Congress reenacted the public safety exemption. Id.
" See Capitano, supra note 40, at 160 (stressing pervasiveness of ADEA). A 1976
Supreme Court decision, however, demonstrates that this was not always the norm.
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 317 (1976). In Murgia, a
Massachusetts state police officer brought an action arguing that the state statute requiring him to retire at age 50 was unconstitutional because it violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 309. In overturning the Massachusetts
District Court's decision, the Supreme Court reasoned that the age classification was
rationally related to furthering a legitimate state interest and therefore did not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 314. The court acknowledged the state's interest of having physically fit officers so that they could protect the public. Id. See also Popkins v.
Zagel, 611 F. Supp. 809, 813 (C.D. I11.1985) (finding rational basis for mandatorily
retiring police officers).
See Ryder v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 128 F.3d 128, 136 (3d Cir. 1997) (setting forth four part standard).
47
1 See EEOC v. New Jersey, 631 F. Supp 1506, 1507 (D.N.J. 1986) aff'd, 815 F.2d
694 (3rd Cir. 1987) (establishing police department retired officers based solely because
of age); Gately v. Commonwealth, 1998 WL 518179, *1 (D. Mass. June 8, 1998) (recognizing Massachusetts law mandating officers to retire at age 55).
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that the termination falls within an ADEA exception.48 One exception, an
extremely narrow affirmative defense, permits employers to mandatorily
retire an employee based on age, when "age is a bona fide occupational
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business., 49 The ADEA drafters, however, provided no indication
of what specifically constitutes a BFQQ. 50

IV. THE SUPREME COURT STANDARD: THE DEVELOPMENT OF
THE TWO-TIERED BFOQ TEST
The Supreme Court outlined the test for what constitutes a
BFOQ in Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell.51 In Criswell, the Court
formally adopted the two prong test the Fifth Circuit initially applied in
Usery v. Tamiani Trail Tours Inc.52 The first prong of the test requires
the job qualification must be "reasonably necessary" to achieve the company's central objective.53 The Criswell Court emphasized that when
4
8See
EEOC v. County of Santa Barbara, 666 F.2d 373, 375 (9th Cir. 1982) (acknowledging two exceptions that allow employers to set age qualifications). In addition
to the BFOQ exception, the ADEA permits employers to set age qualifications when
pursuant to a bona fide seniority plan or bona fide employee benefit plan. 29 U.S.C.A. §
623(f)(2) (West 1994).
" 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(f)(1) (West 1994).
6See

id. (providing no specification of what constitutes BFOQ).

6'472 U.S. 400,413-17 (1985). See also Johnson v. Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore, 472 U.S. 353, 362 (1985) (providing guidance in determining what constitutes BFOQ). The Johnson Court emphasized that employers must make particularized
factual findings why they implemented job qualifications. Id.
52531 F.2d 224, 234-37 (5th Cir. 1976). The Usery court relied on Fifth Circuit
cases for each prong. See Diaz v. Pan American World Airways Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388
(5th Cir. 1976) (requiring employer to show that job qualification reasonably necessary,
not just tangentially related); Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 408
F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969) (requiring employer to proffer empirical data which supports correlation between age and ability). The Criswell Court further noted that Congress intended the BFOQ exception to be "extremely narrow." Criswell,472 U.S. at 412
(quoting Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977)).
"See Criswell, 472 U.S. at 413 (elaborating on how court may deem something
reasonably necessary). The reasonably necessary standard rejects the more lenient reasonably related standard the First Circuit applied in a similar case a year earlier. Mahoney v. Trabucco, 738 F.2d 35, 37 (1st Cir. 1984) (noting court only requires reasonable
relationship between age and business). The Mahoney court relied upon the reasonably
related language the court used in a contemporary Seventh Circuit case. Id. See also
Orzel v. City of Wauwatosa Fire Dept., 697 F.2d 743, 753 (7th Cir. 1983) (requiring
reasonable relationship). But see EEOC v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, 565 F.
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Congress passed the ADEA, the legislators intended it to have a standard
of "reasonable necessity," rather than mere reasonableness.- 4 In other
words, an employer may not discriminate on the basis of age just because
it is convenient or advantageous to do so. 55 Accordingly, scholars have
compared this reasonable necessity requirement to be analogous to the
strict scrutiny of suspect classifications that courts implement in Fourteenth Amendment cases because of its rigid standard. 6
If the court finds the employer's job qualification reasonably
necessary to fulfill the central mission of the company's objective, the
employer must then pass the second prong of the Criswell test and demonstrate why they relied on age as a proxy for job qualifications. 5 7 This
requires the employer to show it had a factual basis for believing all or
substantially all of the employees over the job qualification would be
unable to safely and efficiently perform the duties of their job.58 If the
employer is unable to meet this standard, then it must demonstrate it is
"impossible or highly impractical" to identify on an individualized basis
whether those candidates over the age qualifications could safely and
efficiently perform their job duties.5 9

Supp. 520, 523 (E.D. Pa 1983) (rejecting employer's assertion that reasonably related
standard may be used to meet BFOQ standard).
See Criswell, 472 U.S. at 414 (reiterating legislative intent).
See id. (asserting test is difficult to pass).
"See Sampen, supra note 4, at 23 (analogizing both standards because of their
rejection of rational basis test).
7

See Criswell, 472 U.S. at 414 (detailing test and how employers can pass it).
"See id. at 414 (quoting Usery v. Tamiani Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 235
(5th Cir. 1976)) (setting forth standard of review).
" Criswell, 472 U.S. at 414-15. The EEOC also adopted the Criswell test and declared in its regulations that an employer asserting a BFOQ defense has the burden of
proving that "(1) the age limit is reasonably necessary to the essence of the business, and
either (2) all or substantially all individuals excluded from the job are in fact disqualified, or (3) some of the individuals so excluded possess a disqualifying trait that cannot
be ascertained except by reference to age." 29 C.F.R. § 1625.6(b) (1993). The EEOC
added another element to this test by declaring that if the employer's objective in asserting a BFOQ is the goal of public safety, the employer must prove that the challenged
practice does indeed effectuate that goal, and there is no acceptable alternative which
would better advance or equally advance it with less discriminatory impact. id.
'
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V. BFQQ CASE LAW

The BFOQ exception is extremely narrow resulting in a majority
of courts ruling that employers fail to meet the standard. 60 This is most
likely because employers have the difficult task of making particularized
findings that led them to implement these job qualifications. 6 Management may not implement job qualifications for employment by using
implicit, stereotypical, or unsubstantiated assumptions that older people
are not adequately able to perform the duties of their job.62 Additionally,
employers cannot assert the BFOQ defense because of economic
factors. 63 For example, an employer may not set an age-based hiring
system solely to maximize profits. 64
The Supreme Court has not outlined the specific facts necessary
to fulfill the two-tiered Criswell test and therefore courts have been

60

See Schiff, supra note 4, at 23-34 (giving comprehensive analysis of BFOQ

cases).
61 See

Johnson v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 472 U.S. 353 362 (1985)

(noting necessity of particularized findings).
6 See Beck v. Bourogh of Manheim, 505 F. Supp. 923, 925 (E.D. Pa. 1981)
(holding employer may not rely upon stereotypical notions or hunches about age). Aaron
v. Davis, 414 F. Supp. 453, 461 (E.D. Ark. 1976) (providing employers may not rely on
hunches without empirical justification); EEOC v. County of Santa Barbara, 666 F.2d
373, 376 (9th Cir. 1982) (noting ADEA condemns assumptions that older people cannot
adequately perform their jobs).
6' See EEOC v. County of Los Angeles, 706 F.2d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 1982)
(holding employers should not consider cost benefit analysis when implementing age
qualification). In this case, the court examined whether a county could set a maximum
hiring age for helicopter pilots and deputy sheriffs. Id. at 1040. The County of Los
Angeles argued that if it hired people over the age of 35 it would receive a "less than
optimal return on the training it provided for these pilots." Id. at 1042. The court rejected this argument stating that Congress designed the ADEA for the specific reason of
eliminating age discrimination based on economic factors. See also Johnson, 472 U.S. at
365-370 (noting implementation of mandatory retirement age cannot occur because of
cost-cutting.)
See County of Los Angeles, 706 F.2d at 1042 (explaining that employer may not
set age qualification based on economic factors). The American judicial system affords
much more protection against age discrimination to its older citizens than the British
judicial system. Bryan D. Glass, Comment, The British Resistance to Age Discrimination Legislation: Is it Time to Follow the U.S. Example?, 16 CoMP. LAB. L.J. 491, 504
(1995). For example, in the United Kingdom, employers may set an age ceiling when
searching for prospective employees. Id. This age cutoff saves the employers administrative costs by allowing them to sift through a large number of applications for particular positions. Id.
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widely split in settling a standard. 65 For example, the circuit courts have
been widely inconsistent in defining the meaning of "particular business."66 The Seventh Circuit reasoned that the plain meaning of the
phrase "particular business" left it unsusceptible to further interpretation
and therefore specific occupations within a particular business should not
be treated differently.67 Consequently, if a mandatory retirement policy
applies to a police officer who performs hazardous duties on the front
line, that same mandatory retirement policy should apply to the sedentary
police officer who works in an administrative capacity.68
Alternatively, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that particular occupations within the particular business should be treated differently. 69 The
court reasoned that Congress enacted the ADEA to promote employment
based on ability rather than the age.70 Consequently, the court found it
unfair to retire a police chief who could perform all the duties of his ponot perform the duties of a different position within the
sition, but could
7'
department.
In Mahoney v. Trabucco,7 2 the First Circuit adopted the middle
ground between the Seventh and Eighth Circuit's conflicting
approaches.73 In Mahoney, the plaintiff held the position of sergeant spe-

See infra notes 66-104 and accompanying text (noting inconsistencies in court
decisions).
Compare EEOC v. City of Janesville, 630 F.2d 1254, 1258 (7th Cir. 1980)
(holding specific occupations within business should not be treated differently) with
EEOC v. City of St. Paul, 671 F.2d 1162, 1165-66 (8th Cir. 1982) (holding specific occupations within business should be treated differently).
67 See City of Janesville, 630 F.2d at 1258 (arguing Congress
could have used specific language if it wanted individual occupations within business treated differently).
See id. (holding employers must apply uniform mandatory retirement policy).
See City of St. Paul, 671 F.2d at 1165-66 (explaining employer must set age
qualification on case by case basis, not legislative fiat).
69

id. (articulating ADEA's purpose).
71See id. (holding uniform policy would be inconsistent with goal of ability-based
decisions). As a result, the Eight Circuit applied different standards for police chiefs and
police troopers. Id. In the past, critics have argued that this approach could become
unworkable for employers if they had to consider each specific job position when it
establishes its BFOQ defense. EEOC v. State of Tennessee Wildlife Resources Agency,
696 F. Supp. 1163, 1177 (M.D. Tenn. 1986). This criticism, however, seems to overlook
the premise that an employer should treat each situation on an individualized, factintensive basis. See Fischman, supra note 38, at 339 (arguing that analyzing employee's
duties is consistent with ADEA's purpose and with public safety concerns).
70See

7

738 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1984).
See id.at 38 (noting court found middle ground in between both decisions).
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cializing in telecommunications and therefore the officer rarely ventured
into the field.74 At the time, however, Massachusetts law mandated that
all state police officers must retire at age 50, even if the officer only
worked in an administrative capacity.75 The Mahoney court defined
"duties of the job" as referring to each discrete vocation within the state
police organization.7 6 Essentially, the court reasoned that police officers
of different ranks have different duties, and therefore every rank should
be analyzed separately.7 7 The court did not want to distinguish between
the duties within each rank and consequently all sergeants were treated
the same for BFOQ purposes. 7 8 The court stressed that all officers of a
paramilitary organization, like a police department, are subject to reassignment in times of emergency, and that the rank of the officer, rather
than the officer's permanent or temporary assignment will determine the
occupation of the officer.7 9
Courts also use a fact specific analysis in applying the Criswell
test when determining how an employer deems something reasonably
necessary. 80 In EEOC v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,81 the Third
Circuit concluded that if a police department does not implement, develop, and enforce a program which sets minimum fitness standards for
all its officers, the department can not justify its mandatory retirement
law by relying on good health as a BFOQ. s2 The police department was
estopped from asserting an effective BFOQ defense because it does not
74

See id. at 37 (recognizing that officer works in mainly administrative position).

76See id. at 36 (noting Massachusetts law does not give more leniency to officer
working in administrative capacity).
76 See id. at 39 (explaining differences of occupations within departments).
77See Mahoney v. Trabucco, 738 F.2d 35, 38 (1st Cir. 1984) (noting no correlation
between rank and strenuous activity).
78 See id. (recognizing inconsistent treatment of same ranks causes problems).

See id. at 39 (arguing court's interpretation is faithful to words "occupational
qualification"). The court recognized this approach's shortcomings as well. Id. It acknowledged that this approach would sweepingly classify one rank to retire at a certain
age, even if there were specialists who should not be forced to retire. Id. at 41. The
court, however, maintained that this approach would be useful to prevent both overt and
veiled attempts to undermine the purposes of the ADEA. Id.
8 See infra notes 81-112 and accompanying text (noting courts' various interpretations to deem if BFOQ reasonably necessary).
8'829 F.2d 392 (3rd Cir.1987).
See id. at 395 (advancing necessity of minimum fitness standard). The court disregarded the fact that the Pennsylvania State Police was in the process of developing a
minimum fitness standard for all officers. id. But see infra notes 91-96 and accompanying text (noting First Circuit's use of different standard).
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fulfill the first prong of the Criswell test establishing that the job qualifi83
cation is reasonably necessary to the central mission of the business.
Before a trait can be a BFOQ, the employer must demonstrate that this
trait is required for all employees. 84
Similarly, in EEOC v. Kentucky State Police Dep't,85 the Sixth
Circuit held that the Kentucky State Police could not justify its mandatory retirement age of 55 by relying on physical fitness as a BFOQ because the police department never implemented a minimum fitness standard .8 Although the department claimed that cardiovascular fitness and
aerobic capacity were reasonably necessary to the central mission of their
business, the department had no program for testing the fitness of these
officers.8 7 The court emphasized that the physical fitness requirement
was not reasonably necessary because the department retained the services of many officers under age 55 who had endured heart surgery and
suffered heart attacks.8 8 If the Sixth Circuit categorized this BFOQ as
reasonably necessary despite the absence of employee fitness standards,
it would have contradicted the purposes of the ADEA. 89
Not all courts are in accord with the views of the Third and Sixth
Circuits. 90 In EEOC v. City of East Providence,9' the First Circuit declared that physical strength and conditioning were reasonably necessary
to the performance of a police force even though the police department
did not require its officers to meet any conditioning standards. 92 In upSee EEOC v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 829 F.2d at 395 (declaring police
department will fail test because it did not meet first prong).
See id. at 395 (noting ADEA does not require strict monitoring of particular
qualification at all age levels). ADEA does, however, prohibit selective age based enforcement of these qualifications. Id.
860 F.2d 665 (6th Cir. 1988).
See id. at 669 (finding that police department did not compel younger officers to
meet fitness standard).
See id. at 667 (noting evidence demonstrated department did not attempt to require good health of officers).
See id. (noting 25 year veteran died at 49 after suffering fourth heart attack while
in police cruiser.) In fact, the department retained their services without any reduction of
their duties. Id.
89
See supra note 39 and accompanying text (discussing ADEA's purpose is to
prevent arbitrary age discrimination).
" See infra notes 91-100 and accompanying text (articulating First and Fifth Circuits' positions).
9' 798 F.2d 524 (1st Cir. 1986).
92 See id. at 530 (acknowledging department fulfilled both prongs of Criswell test).
Once the police department fulfilled the reasonable necessity of their age qualification, it
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holding this BFOQ, the First Circuit primarily relied on testimony from
retired officers who maintained that physical strength and stamina were
reasonably necessary to the operation of the police department.93 The
court noted that although the existence of physical fitness testing reinforces the proposition that physical conditioning is reasonably necessary,
the lack of testing should not indicate that it is not reasonably
necessary. 94 Conversely, a police force with low physical fitness standards, coupled with other factors, may indicate to a court that health and
fitness are not reasonably necessary for the job. 95 The First Circuit reasoned that Congress intended the ADEA to be used as a shield to protect
older employees, not as a sword to compel employers to perfect their
procedures for assuring maximum physical fitness of their younger employees. 96
In EEOC v. Miss. State Tax Commn',9 the Fifth Circuit adopted a
different standard, finding a middle ground between the polar views of

had no problem meeting the second prong of the Criswell test because it presented undisputed evidence that the officers over the age of 60 could not meet the force's physical
standards. Id. at 527. The evidence was undisputed because the EEOC failed to procure
medical experts to rebut the witnesses in a timely manner. Id. See also supra notes 5759 and accompanying text (outlining criteria for second tier of Criswell test).
9 East Providence, 798 F.2d at 530. Each of the retired officers,
who were either
detectives, patrolmen, or patrol sergeants testified that they "performed one or more of
the following tasks: chasing a suspected criminal, struggling with a suspect, pushing a
car that blocked traffic, arresting a gunman at gunpoint, engaging in a high speed motor
vehicle chase, and rescuing a victim from a burning car." Id. In this case, to assert a
successful BFOQ defense, the police department had to establish a factual basis for believing that officers over the age of 60 could not meet the physical standards in addition
to fulfilling the reasonably necessary test. See supra note 92 (describing how police
department fulfilled second prong of Criswell test).
9 See East Providence, 798 F.2d at 530 (holding no testing does not prove lack of
departmental requirement of officers in top condition). See also James M. Wicks, Comment, Proving that Over Age Sixty is Over the Hillfor Police Officers: EEOC v. Pennsylvania, 62 ST. JOHN'S L. REv 361, 369-70 (1988) (arguing that requiring fitness testing
to uphold reasonably necessary standard is unfair to employer). The Eight Circuit and
First Circuit have similar views regarding the lack of a physical fitness standard. See
EEOC v. Missouri State Highway Patrol, 748 F.2d 447, 454 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding
regular physical fitness program is unnecessary when implementing mandatory retirement program).

96See East Providence,798 F.2d at 530 (stressing officer's health is reasonably
necessary to job despite department's lack of monitoring).
See id. at 529 (commenting on Congressional intent).
9'873 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1989).
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the First and Third Circuits. 98 The Fifth Circuit held that the fact-finder
should decide whether a police force's lack of fitness standards supported
the notion that the police do not consider physical conditioning reasonably necessary. 99 The court noted that the Supreme Court stressed the
necessity of "fact-finding on a case by case basis under the ADEA
structure."1°°
Courts have striven to effectuate the purpose of the ADEA, to
eliminate arbitrary age discrimination by asserting that an employer must
provide particularized, factual evidence to show that a substantial amount
of the employees over the mandatory retirement age could not perform
the duties of their job.'O In age discrimination cases, the evidentiary burden the employer must advance depends on the risk of harm imposed on
the public and other employees should the employer eliminate this mandatory retirement age. 0 2 Accordingly, when there is a high risk of harm
and the alternative measures to the age discrimination lack certainty and
adequacy, the employer is permitted a greater degree of discretion in
setting the mandatory retirement age.'03 When public safety is in question, courts would prefer employers to err on the side of caution.' °4

See id. at 99 (reasoning lack of fitness standard may or may not be job qualification).
"See id. (giving great deference to fact finder's conclusions during lower court's
proceedings).
'00Id. (quoting Western Air Lines v. Criswell, Inc., 472 U.S. 400, 422 (1985)).
'0' See Durant v. Maher Chevrolet, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 787, 789 (M.D. Fla. 1991)
(declaring ADEA remedial in nature); Ciswell, 472 U.S. at 410 (finding ADEA applies
with especial force to mandatory retirement provisions); Johnson v. Mayor and City
Council of Baltimore, 472 U.S. 355, 362 (1985) (outlining requirement of particularized
findings).
'02 See Beck v. Manheim, 505 F. Supp. 923,925 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (stressing importance of keeping employees out of harm's way)
13 See Usery v. Tamiani Trail Tours, 531 F.2d 224, 236 (5th Cir. 1976) (noting
public safety is of great concern); Beck, 505 F. Supp. at 925 (recognizing employers
must act prudently when public safety at issue).
104See Usery, 531 F.2d at 236 (holding employer satisfied BFOQ standard based
on safety considerations); Beck, 505 F. Supp. at 925 (allowing police department to implement mandatory retirement system because of small force). In Beck, the court noted
that the local police force was small and if the police department retained officers who
were incapable of performing their duties, then other officers would have to help out,
thereby making them unable to complete their required duties. Id. at 927. Consequently, the court allowed this mandatory retirement system because it was hesitant to
put the public at risk as it feared that officers would inadequately protect the public. Id.
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In EEOC v. New Jersey,0 5 a case upholding a mandatory retirement age as a BFOQ, the Third Circuit reasoned that all or substantially
all of the officers over the age of 55 could not safely and efficiently perform police duties because of diminished aerobic capacity.' °6 The New
Jersey State Police argued that the health and fitness of their officers was
reasonably necessary to the central mission of their business. 10 7 The
courts agreed that the officer's fitness was reasonably necessary because
the police department required all of its officers to participate in an annual fitness exam which measured their ability to perform rudimentary
activities.1°8 Having met the first prong of the Criswell test, the police
department needed to satisfy the second prong.'0 9 Neither party disputed
that to safely and efficiently perform a police officer's duties, the officer
must meet a certain minimum aerobic capacity." Further, overwhelming and largely undisputed evidence demonstrated that all or substantially all of the officers would not possess that minimum capacity."'
631 F. Supp. 1506 (D.N.J. 1986) affd, 815 F.2d 694 (3rd Cir. 1987).
lUSee id. at 1515 (holding medical evidence at trial substantiated this argument).
107 See id. at 1508 (arguing that police officers must be in peak physical condition).
'" See id. at 1514 (noting police department forced retirement of police officers
with significant known health problems). Conversely, in EEOC v. Kentucky State Police
Dept., the court noted that the police force retained officers who had significant health
problems and therefore it rejected the police department's argument that physical fitness
was reasonably necessary to effectuate their goal. EEOC v. Kentucky State Police Dept.,
860 F.2d at 669. See also supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text (detailing Kentucky's state police forces acceptance of officers in poor health); Heiar v. Crawford
County 746 F.2d 1190, 1198 (7th Cir. 1984) (noting fallibility of fitness tests significant
only to consequences of retaining unfit employee).
In See New Jersey, 631 F. Supp at 1514 (admitting department met first prong).
As stated earlier, the second prong in the BFOQ test states that employers must prove
either they had a factual basis for believing all or substantially all of the [officers over
the age of 55] would be able to perform the duties of the job involved or it is impossible
or highly impractical to deal with the [officers over the age of 55] on an individualized
basis. Western Air Lines v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 414 (1985) (quoting Usery v. Tamiani Trail Tours, 531 F.2d 224, 236 (5th Cir. 1976)).
See New Jersey, 631 F. Supp. at 1510 (specifying minimum aerobic capacity
level was 41 ml/kg/min).
...
See id. (indicating overwhelming evidence at preliminary injunction hearing
demonstrated officers would not have minimum capacity). Both sides agreed that at
least 95% of the officers over age 55 would not have the requisite aerobic fitness. Id. In
addition, the state proffered persuasive medical evidence which concluded that a large
percentage of officers over the age of 55 possess significant, but silent, coronary artery
disease. Id. at 1507. Further, the risk of this disease, which could cause sudden death,
would prevent these officers from safely and efficiently performing their duties as an
officer. id. at 1513. Moreover, at the time, doctors could not screen for this heart dis-
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Accordingly, it appears that the only way an employer is assured of proffering a factual basis that the employees over the mandatory retirement
duties of their job is when there is uncontested,
age cannot perform the
12
evidence."
undisputed
In 1992, a team of medical experts, led by Dr. Frank Landy, released a thorough and authoritative report that stated unequivocally that
currently available tests were more effective than age in determining an
officer's fitness to serve." 3 Accordingly, the Landy report suggested that
law enforcement agencies and fire departments should adopt physical
and psychological tests to determine the officer's fitness to serve rather
than merely implementing mandatory retirement schemes." 4 Congress
also recognized that age is not an accurate predictor of an officer's fitness
to serve because in 1996 it passed amendments to the ADEA stating that
an officer must pass a physical fitness exam rather then being forced into
mandatory retirement.15

ease on an individualized basis because these techniques were medically impracticable
and unacceptable. Id. at 1511.
112 Compare New Jersey, 631 F. Supp. at 1510-11 affd, 815 F.2d 694 (3rd Cir.
1987) (upholding department's BFOQ because evidence showed officers over 55 will not
have requisite aerobic capacity) with EEOC v. Kentucky State Police Dept., 860 F.2d at
667 (rejecting employer's BFOQ because of mitigating evidence).
113 See Frank J. Landy et al., Alternatives to ChronologicalAge in Determining
Standardsof Suitabilityfor Public Safety Jobs, Executive Summary, at 17-18 (1992)
(finding risk factor screenings effective when determining chance for heart attack)
[hereinafter Landy]. The Landy Report maintained that age is a poor predictor in determining a public safety officer's ability to serve. Id. After studying more than 2000 subjects comprised of police officers, firefighters and correctional officers, the report indicated that as officers age they gradually engage in more administrative work. Id. Consequently, if they remained on the force, their skills, experience, and wisdom is passed on
to the young, inexperienced officers who engage in the more physically demanding parts
of the job. Id. at 4, 5. See also H.R. REP. No 97-52, pt. 1, p. 2, (1977), quoted in
Criswell, 472 U.S. at 411 (maintaining mandatory retirement results in loss of skills in
workforce).
'"See Landy, supra note 113, at 17, 18 (recognizing effectiveness of testing).
'"See 29 U.S.C.A. § 4(j) (West 1997) (amending ADEA). Specifically, these
amendments, which only pertain to subsequently enacted police retirement statutes,
decree that states must "(a) compile a list of tasks that all police officers must be able to
perform; (b) develop and promulgate corresponding fitness tests; and (c) implement a
nationwide fitness testing regimen by September 30, 2000 to excuse from age based
compulsory retirement any officer who can pass such a test." Id.

20001

MANDATORY RETIREMENT PROVISIONS
VI. MASSACHUSETTS LAW

Recently, Massachusetts tackled a new issue regarding mandatory retirement for police officers: whether the state can mandatorily
retire a police officer pursuant to a consolidation of police forces." 6 In
Gately v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the court held that the
ADEA superseded and preempted a consolidation act and permanently
enjoined the Commonwealth from requiring its officers to retire solely
because of their age.' 17 In Gately, the plaintiffs brought an action claiming the mandatory retirement age of 55 violated the ADEA." 3 The state
forced this involuntary retirement pursuant to the Consolidation Act,
mandating that state police forces, the Metropolitan District Commission
(MDC), the Massachusetts Division of State Police, the Capitol Police,
and the Registry of Motor Vehicles Law Enforcement Division consolidate into the Department of State Police." 9 Before the Consolidation
Act, the MDC, Capitol Police, and the Motor Vehicles Division had retirement ages of 65 while the Massachusetts Division of State Police had
a mandatory retirement age of 50.120
For years, the MDC, Registry, and Capitol Police forces had
been working until the age of 65.121 In 1989, just three years before the
Consolidation Act, the Commonwealth performed a comprehensive study
that recommended no change in the retirement age of 65 for the three
police forces. 122 Nevertheless, the legislature decreed that the members
of these police forces must retire ten years earlier even though the traditional retirement age had been 65.123 In addition, since the implementaSee infra notes 117-150 and accompanying text (discussing Gately).
.17
See Gately v. Commonwealth, 1998 WL 518179, *12 (D. Mass. June 8, 1998)
116

(holding ADEA supersedes Consolidation Act and police departments could not establish
age 55 as BFOQ).
8
" See id. at *1 (noting plaintiffs brought action on December 21, 1992 to prevent
imposition retirement date of December 31, 1992).
' See 1991 Mass. Acts ch. 412 § 122-123 (detailing Consolidation Act).
20 See Gately, 1998 WL 518179, at *1 (announcing Consolidation Act repealed
MASS. GEN. L. ch. 32 § 69(d) and MASS. GEN. L. ch. 32 § 26(3)(a)).
121 See Gately, 1998 WL 518179, at *1 (acknowledging that before Consolidation

Act officers could work until 65).
1" See Brief for the Plaintiffs at 20, Gately v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 2
F.3d 1221 (1st Cir. 1993) (No. 92-2485) (noting Commonwealth did major study and
recommended no change).
123 See 1991 Mass. Acts ch. 412 § 122-123 (acknowledging three segments of Massachusetts police officers will have their retirement age lowered ten years).
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tion of this lowered retirement age, there have been impressive advancements in medicine and labor saving technology, but despite these
Commonwealth still decided to lower the mandatory
advancements, the
24
retirement age.'
The plaintiff police officers, all former members of the now defunct law enforcement agencies, brought this action to enjoin the state
from retiring them based solely on their age.' 25 The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts entered judgement for the
plaintiffs and granted a preliminary injunction. 26 In doing so, the court
held 7that the plaintiffs demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits.

2

On appeal, the Commonwealth argued that Mahoney established
the mandatory retirement of age 50 as a BFOQ for State Police officers
and therefore the court should not upset stare decisis.128 The First Circuit
Court of Appeals distinguished this case from Mahoney by reasoning that
this case involved a different set of facts, a more developed set of rules,
and first impression legal issues. 29 Further, in Gately, the police officers
presented evidence that was not available for the police officers in Mahoney, and this new evidence stated unequivocally that there are ways to

12

See Brief for the Plaintiffs at 20, Gately v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 2

F.3d 1221 (1st Cir. 1993) (No. 92-2485) (pointing to improvements in health and longevity). Without any empirical, particularized findings to back up this sudden drastic
lowering of age, one can only conclude that the Legislature consolidated the forces because of economic or logistical factors, factors that preclude an effective BFOQ defense.
See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text (noting that economical savings can not
compel mandatory retirement scheme).
126 See Brief for the Plaintiffs at 20, Gately v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 2
F.3d 1221 (1st Cir. 1993) (No. 92-2485) (arguing law violated ADEA).
'2 See Gately v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 811 F. Supp. 26, 31 (D. Mass.
1992) (acknowledging many circuit courts surrendered mandatory retirement ages in
favor of individualized testing).
2 See id. (holding plaintiffs faced irreparable injury and that public interest favored their position).
'2 See Gately v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 2 F.3d 1221, 1226 (1st Cir.
1993) (arguing Mahoney should apply to this case).
'29 See id. at 1228 (declaring stare decisis does not provide basis for avoiding trial
on merits); see also supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text (noting that in 1985 Supreme Court adopted two-tiered standard when determining BFOQs). The Gately cases
are the first cases in the country which have dealt with mandatory retirement provisions
that arise solely because of a consolidation act. Nicole M. Arangio, FirstCircuitStrikes
Down Age-Based Mandatory Retirement Policyfor State Police Officers--Gately v. Massachusetts, 28 SUFFOLK L. REv. 929, 934 (1994).
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identify officers who could not perform their duties. 30 In addition, Mahoney and Gately were not addressing the same central issue.' 31 In Gately, the parties focused on whether the ADEA could permit the Commonwealth to merge four police forces into one consolidated force,
thereby raising the retirement age of one segment of the force by five
years, and lowering the retirement age of three segments of the force by
32
ten years, notwithstanding that the four forces' duties were identical.
Because of these circumstantial differences, the court did not follow the
Mahoney
precedent in affirming the District Court of Massachusetts'
33
ruling.
In 1998, the officers brought this action once again, seeking to
permanently enjoin the state from mandatorily retiring them. 3 4 The
Commonwealth had the burden of proving there was a BFOQ, and therefore it had to fulfill the Criswell test.' 35 The Commonwealth first had to
prove that this mandatory retirement age for its officers was reasonably
necessary so that the officers would perform their duties safely.' 36 The
Commonwealth argued that the purpose of establishing this mandatory
retirement age was to ensure the physical preparedness and fitness of its
officers. 37 Yet the police department could not establish this mandatory
retirement age simply by assuming that fitness declines with age. 3 8 The
police officers, however, conceded that this mandatory retirement age
'so See Gately, 2 F.3d at 1227 (arguing better alternatives than age-based mandatory retirement of police officers).
3 See Brief for the Plaintiffs at 8, Gately v. Commonwealth
of Massachusetts, 2
F.3d 1221 (1st Cir. 1993) (No. 92-2485) (explaining difference between Gately and
Mahoney).
3 See id. (distinguishing Mahoney because it dealt with preconsolidated police

force).
1. See Gately, 2 F.3d at 1227 (holding Mahoney precedent not applicable to case).
"uGately v. Commonwealth, 1998 WL 518179, *1 (D. Mass. June 8, 1998). In addition, the officers filed a motion for summary judgement arguing that the provisions of
the ADEA preempted the Consolidation Act. Id. Instead of responding to the specific
arguments, the Commonwealth filed a motion to deny the summary judgement in order
to give more time to its experts and the EEOC's experts to conduct more testing to determine whether age 55 is a BFOQ. Id. at 3.
See id. at *5 (quoting Celotex Corp v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986))
(clarifying that Commonwealth had burden of proving elements of BFOQ test). If the
Commonwealth could not pass the BFOQ test, then the court must grant the officers their
motion for summary judgement. Id.
See id. at *3 (commenting that Commonwealth must pass first prong of test).
137 See id. at *4 (establishing
reason).
138 See id. (implying this would violate
ADEA).
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was reasonably necessary to further the overriding interest of public
safety, therefore allowing the Commonwealth to fulfill the first prong of
the BFOQ test. 3 9
The Commonwealth attempted to fulfill the second prong by asserting that it had a factual basis that all or substantially all of the officers would be unable to perform their duties of the job.' 40 Without any
empirical data to back up these assertions, the Commonwealth's argument was unpersuasive.14 ' Additionally, the plaintiffs provided sufficient
evidence demonstrating that the Commonwealth used age as an indicator
of ability. 42 For example, no municipal police department in Massachusetts retired their officers at age 55 or below. 43 Further, since the consolidation of the forces in 1992, there had not been one incident demonstrating that an officer endangered himself or the public while in the line
of duty. 44 In addition, the Landy medical report found that there were
efficient tests to indicate the fitness of an officer. 45 Likewise, Congress,
by passing its 1996 Amendments to the ADEA, once again reinforced the
notion that age was not a good predictor of ability.' 46
The police officers argued that this mandatory retirement age
should not be necessary because the Massachusetts State Police recently
implemented a minimum fitness test, the Gebhardt-Landy Test, which
examines medical and physical fitness for its officers.1 47 This test advanced the goal of public safety with a less discriminatory impact than
1
See Gately v. Commonwealth, 1998 WL 518179, at *4 (conceding point because both parties struggled to establish minimum physical fitness standard for officers).
...
See id. at *5 (asserting factual basis for believing officers over 55 would be un-

able to perform job).
...
See id. at *6 (describing test results that some officers over 55 performed better
than younger counterparts).
2
11 See supra notes 143-144 (presenting evidence proving Commonwealth
used age
as predictor of ability).
4 See Gately v. Commonwealth, 1998 WL 518179, at *6 (questioning reasoning
behind Commonwealth's implementation of new mandatory retirement plan).
'"See id. (implying Commonwealth is using age as indicator of ability).
'+ See Landy, supra note 113, at 17-18 (asserting medical testing is effective in
screening for potential health risks for people over 55).
' See supra note 115, (setting forth 1996 ADEA amendments).
47
1 See Gately v. Commonwealth, 1998 WL 518179, at *3 (arguing
efficient, individualized testing better than mandatory retirement scheme). This annual fitness test is
necessary for any officer who wants to reenlist. Id. Meanwhile, the governor has been
working to amend the Consolidation Act. Id. at *2. The proposed bill, H 1260, would
permit any officers over age 55 to remain on the force if they passed the Gebhardt-Landy
Test. Id.
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mandatory retirement. 148 The court agreed with this argument and
granted a permanent injunction that precluded the Commonwealth from
forcing officers to retire because of age, in addition to finding that the
ADEA preempted and superseded the Consolidation Act. 149 By enjoining the Commonwealth from forcing the members of the now consolidated police force 50to retire at age 55, Massachusetts set a landmark equitable precedent.
VII. CONCLUSION
At the dawn of the 21st century, it appears that rigid age-based
mandatory retirement systems for police officers will become a thing of
the past. After the dissemination of comprehensive medical studies and
the enactment of the 1996 ADEA amendments, employers must once and
for all realize that just because a worker reaches a certain age that worker
does not necessarily become a liability. Today, police officers who reach
retirement age can prolong their careers by passing a fitness test. This
individualized testing will effectuate the goal of the ADEA, to erase the
notion that older employees are inherently less efficient than their
younger counterparts. Finally, the ADEA will provide protection to state
and local law enforcement personnel, protection that was unavailable
when police departments mandated their officers to retire at a certain
age.
It is time for America to embrace the idea that age is not a predictor of ability, even for police officers. Further, if a police officer can
pass all the minimum fitness standards and withstand medical evaluations, then that officer should be allowed to continue to serve the public.
Moreover, it is essential that these older police officers remain on the
force because wisdom and experience can only be gained by age. As
these officers instill this wisdom on their younger colleagues, everyone,
including society in general will reap the benefit.

Eric Andrew Fox

See id. at 7-8 (precluding Commonwealth from arguing there is no way to individually test).
9 See id. at *12 (setting forth court's decision).
'60See id. (holding Commonwealth may not retire officers based solely on age).

